Extremist Upsurge in Bangladesh Politics

Rajendra Prasad Patel

To cite this article: Rajendra Prasad Patel (2018): Extremist Upsurge in Bangladesh Politics, Journal of North East India Studies, 8(1), 2018, pp. 88-99.

Published online: 24 September 2018.

Submit your article to this journal: editor.jneis@yahoo.com

Terms and conditions of use: This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Association for North East India Studies.
Extremist Upsurge in Bangladesh Politics

Rajendra Prasad Patel

Bangladesh is the third largest Muslim populated country in the world and is known for its strongly secular and syncretic culture, robust socioeconomic growth, booming trade and worker remittances, and among the most successful rural credit networks in the world. But the country is facing severe challenges from violent Islamist groups because the role of Islam in Bangladeshi politics is high contested, and it has been a focal point, and polarized political climate and institutional repression of Islamic parties have enhanced radicalization dynamics and country has become an emerging breeding ground for violent extremism. Over the past years, 30 people belonging to minority communities, mainly Hindu have been murdered by machete wielding radicals. They had also not spared Muslim secular writers, publishers, and bloggers for raising their voices against extremist ideology. These murders accompanied the startling news of ISIS recruiters arrested in Dhaka. Bangladesh has a long history of political and electoral violence that have shaped its political culture, protest, boycott and intense oppositional politics are defining a feature of Bangladesh’s authoritarian and democratic era. The two political events are closely interconnected for the recent rise of violent extremism in Bangladesh, first, the elimination of the caretaker government and secondly, implementation of the war crime tribunal. And that has led to political conflict between the Awami League (AL), and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has resulted in high level of violence and brutal state response. This paper will analyze the major causes of the rise of extremist groups and democratic governance, and inclusive politics can help mitigate the risk of rising extremism in Bangladesh.

Keywords: Extremist, Islamism, Radicalisation, Violence AL, BNP, ISIS, JI

Introduction

Bangladesh is undergoing a fundamental transformation with ethnopolitical conflicts. At the core of ethnopolitical conflicts are issues about state power and distribution of economic and other material resources. The settlement of these has entailed a politi-
cal process of negotiating how to alter radically the way in which state’s power is organize and distributed which, in turn, is resulting in the democratization of the political community, pluralisation of the state and sharing of state sovereignty (Behera, 2012:4). There is an overflow of political activities in Bangladesh. Islamic Ideology becomes separated from the mainstream of politics, but in the country flow of poli
tics is emaciated and also democratic institutions are weak and subjected to repres-
sion by the conservative regimes, religious activities get mixed up with politics and tend to over flood the social arena. Islamic slogans are used not only by the ideo-
logues of national liberation movements and champions of progressive forces but also by the conservative and reactionary regimes (Ahamed, 1983:1114).

In South Asia, The role of religion in politics must introduce with two important, well-known facts. First, the growing religion-politics is a global phenomenon “around the world, religion is leaving or refusing to accept, its assigned place in the private sphere (Riaz, 2010:5). It is a complete reversal of the prediction made in the 1960s that religion would eventually collapse and that most of the humanity would be ei
erather atheists or agnostics (Ibid). Thus, South Asia has had brushes with religious zealotry and growth of bigotry and violence in Bangladesh could have major spillover effects. In the region, especially in the adjoining state of West Bengal and Assam in India, the tides of religious extremism could encourage to press their parochial agenda. In turn, their Hindu counterparts could highlight their rise and promote their own violent (Ganguly, 2016).

In Independent Bangladesh, secularism announced as one of the fundamental principles of state policy. Within five years, however, the Zia Government replaced it by “Absolute faith and trust in the Allah Almighty” through a proclamation in 1977. Vigorous efforts have been made both by the government and non-government institu
tions and organizations to uphold and propagate the ideals and values of Islam since then (ibid).

In Bangladesh, there are many political groups and parties outside mainstream politics, which profess a religion-based political ideology to achieve political objec
tives including capturing state power. In the recent decade, clandestine radical and militants have emerged in large numbers in Bangladesh challenging their respective state. These organizations are too numerous to mention individually. Many of them minuscule and others keep changing their names to avoid any crackdown. But some have built widespread networks within the country and in the region. For example, a Hindu militant group called Abhinav Bharat has emerged, and Bangladesh has also attracted international attention due to the activities of clandestine Islamist militant such as the Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh since 2004 (Riaz, 2010:4).

The presence and influence of the religiopolitical parties are the most obvious indicators of the use of religion as a political ideology, but should not be only indices in measuring the scope and depth of religion’s role in society and politics. Under-
standing the interplay of religion and politics warrants further explanation, espe-
ially the role of state and the society. Adoption of a state religion, as in the case of Bangladesh in 1977 granting a special significance to one religion is a testimony to religion’s political role (Ibid). This measure brings religion to the fore, to begin
with, and then privilege one religion over other. This example is not unique to Bangladesh; European history over the last couple of centuries offers many examples of how the Continent has tried to grapple with the question of the relationship between state and religion. Perhaps that question is yet to be decisively resolved. One of the basic creeds of the United State Constitution, the separation of church and state has explained in various ways, and in recent years an increasingly vocal community has contested this fundamental constitutional tenet (Riaz, 2010:5).

In this way, the public discourses are then adopted by political parties of various creeds, whether or not these parties subscribe to religion as a political ideology. For example in the case of Bangladesh, the Awami league, a self-proclaimed secularist party adopted the discourse of religion in 1990 to counter its opponent the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). These discourses, whether reproduced by the political parties or social organizations, form the basis of politics. Therefore, debates on political ideology should not confine to those groups which play the pivotal role in realpolitik but should also extend beyond. Therefore it is necessary to be understood in the broadest sense of the term (Ibid).

**Evolution of the Bangladesh State**

Bangladesh formed part of India under British rule from 1757 until colonial rule ended in 1947. After 25 years of being a part Pakistan. Pakistan’s discriminatory treatment of its eastern half saw the Awami League’s Sheikh Mujibur –ur-Rahman lead Bangladesh to independence in 1971. Islamist, especially those associated with Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) had collaborated with Pakistan to prevent Bangladesh from seeding, and the subsequent violence killed between 1.5 and 3 million Bengalis. Bangladesh in this way came into force amidst enormous violence and had long inured to a culture of political violence (DeVotta and Timberman, 2012:1).

In term of physical geography, Bangladesh is predominantly a delta plain of one of the largest river systems in the world. Only one region in Southeast is hilly. Bangladesh is world’s eighth populous nation. The total population of the country, recorded in the census in 2001 was 124.35 million (Riaz, 2010:46). The estimated population in 2016 is 162 million. Besides it, according to World Bank (2017) “the country has made substantial progress in reducing poverty because of substantial economic growth. Based on the international poverty line of $1.90 per person per day, Bangladesh reduced poverty from 44.2 per cent in 1991 to 18.5 per cent 2010, and it reached 12.9 per cent in 2016”. In parallel, life expectancy, literacy rate and per capita food production have increased significantly. This progress is underpinned by strong economic growth over the decades and reached to 7.1 per cent growth in 2015-16. Thus, rapid economic growth made possible for Bangladesh to reach the lower middle-income country status in 2014¹.

Geostrategically, Bangladesh is extremely important for s number of reasons. It shares borders with India and China. Bangladesh thus links with two giants. The country also offers critical access to the Indian Ocean, which is an area of tremendous geostrategic importance. The country has the potential for extremely large gas reserves, which makes Bangladesh an energy sensitive country. It is also a bridge
between South and South East Asia.

Religious composition of Bangladesh’s Society
Bangladesh is the largest Muslim majority country in the world. Almost 89 per cent of the population adheres to Islam. Muslims in Bangladesh are predominantly of Sunni denomination, but a small number of Muslims follow the Shia tradition. The largest religious minority of the country is Hindu, comprising 9 per cent in 2001. A very small segment of the population follows the Christianity and Buddhism. Adherents of Minority religions are very barely concentrated in any dominant religion. Among the Christian population, Catholicism is the main denomination (Riaz, 2010:51).

The most significant aspect of the religious composition of the country is the decline of the Hindu population over the last half-century. The censuses conducted since 1951 show that the Hindu population has been decreasing continuously. In 1951, it was 22 per cent and in 1974 Hindu figure came down to 14 per cent, and it reached to 9.2 per cent in 2001 (ibid). The last 2011 census suggests the followers of Hindu faith consists only 8.4 per cent of the population (The Hindu, June 23, 2016). The decline is a result of the migration of a large number of Hindu to neighbouring country India. The migration took place at slow but steady pace due to systematic discrimination against the Hindu and sporadic riots. This trend shows that the Hindu has left the country in great numbers.

Eminent Bangladeshi Scholar, Dr. Abul Barkat (2016) in his book ‘Political Economy of reforming agriculture –land –water bodies in Bangladesh’ says that “there will be no Hindu left in the Bangladesh three decades from 2016”. He says that “the rate of exodus over the past 49 years points to that direction”. He analyzes that from 1964 to 2013, around 11.3 million Hindus left Bangladesh due to religious persecution and discrimination, and according to him ‘on an average 632 Hindu left the country each day and 230,612 annually’. Further, he says that “before the Liberation war, the daily rate of migration was 705 while it was 512 during 1971-1981 and 438 during 1981-1991. The number increased to 767 persons each day during 1991-2001 while around 774 persons left the country during 2001-2012” (Dhaka Tribune, November 20, 2016).

Besides Hindu, Islamist fundamentalists, who are now organised under the banner of the Jamaat i-Islami and associated organization have been targeting other minorities Buddhists, and Christians also and identifying them, in fact, if not in words, as enemies. Buddhists, mainly indigenous hill people inhabiting the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), have been a bigger target. Even the Ahmadiyya sect of Muslims has not safe. The fact is that Ahmadiyyas have been living in Bangladesh since 1912. They faced no serious attacks until 1987 when an organization called the International Khatme Nabuwat Movement Bangladesh (IKNM) attacked and captured several Ahmadiyya mosques in and around Brahmanbaria town in Brahmanbaria district. Since that incident, the community has been facing severe violence constantly. In this way, the fundamentalists are hand-in-glove with a section of the BNP which is pathologically anti-Hindu and anti-India, and with criminal elements. The primary
targets of radical Islamists have been the Hindu, even before the creation of East Pakistan and its post-liberation, emerging as Bangladesh (Karlekar, 2005:254-258).

**Political Secularism**

The growth of secular ideology during the Mujib era notwithstanding mass politics in Bangladesh had remained to influenced by orthodox forces (Ghosh, 1995 69). Sheikh Mujib Rahman introduced secularism a basic principle (together with nationalism, socialism, and democracy) in the December 1972 Constitution. But nation-building in Bangladesh has centered on Islam. And the religion of the vast majority, and a Bengali identity rooted primarily in the Bengali language, and religion was used as a primary identity marker to become part of Pakistan in 1947. It made secondary to Bengali language and culture when seeding from Pakistan and creating Bangladesh (DeVotta and Timberman, 2012:2).

The government’s form of secularism was attempted to maintain an equidistance from all religions rather than completely separating from them. According to Ollapally (2008), “the government controlled television and radio, expert from the holy books of Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity read. Thus, at the highest level of the state, “political secularism” was being dramatically propagated with apparent popular support. One expert argues that it is being promoted by “fundamentalist religious ideology of Jamaat. Moreover, another expert argues that “In the secularized politics of Bangladesh, religion would not have the degree of silence it had in former United Pakistan.” Support for secularism had grown the more the Pakistani rulers were seen to exploit Islam to try to save a united Pakistan (Ollapally, 2008:181).

Historically, the marginal role of religion in politics was natural in Bengal politics given the dominant form of Islam. The arrival of Islam in East Bengal between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries had been peaceful, with conversions by and large of desperately poor landless peasants trying to escape the Hindu caste system. Bengali identity itself had taken strong shape since the ninth century and thus could not be easily displaced. The form of Islam that emerged combined elements of Hinduism and local popular culture with Sufism (Ollapally, 2008, 181-182).

Politics of Bangladesh since independence have to a significant degree given by politicizing these religious and linguistic/ cultural constructs with the AL, and its allies typically promoting a Bengali identity with an avowedly secular platform. While, BNP and its allies countering this with a relatively pro-Islamist stance and BNP claim that both Islamic and Bengali identity exists in equilibrium (DeVotta and Timberman, 2012:1).

**The Rise of Islamism**

Some authors analyze the current and historical narratives of various extremists groups and geo-and domestic politics in Bangladesh. In this context, Ollapally (2010) argues that ‘The rise of violent extremism in Bangladesh to a substantial degree can be traced to the pivotal role of the state. Her main argument is that the state politics, interstate relations and international relations as a whole have an immense influence on the rise and increase of violence in Bangladesh. The merger of security percep-
tions and identity, mediated by the state is put forward as a significant predictor of the level of extremism”. This idea stands in stark competition with the mainstream view that terrorism and extremism mainly have their roots in religious and ethnic factors. On the other hand, it corresponds well with historical accounts depicting Bangladeshi society as promoters of tolerance and co-existence (Ollapally, 2010: 351).

The injection of religion into the political sphere was not the result of a popular upsurge; it was state led under military rule. The violent overthrow of Mujib Rahman in 1975 marked the beginning of a new trend in this direction. There had been growing disaffection with post-independence Awami League government, not with its defining principles, but with it’s over personalization, patronage, ineptitude and perceived corruption. The military coup by general Zia ur-Rahman, however, new leadership turned to religion as a legitimizing tool (Ollapally, 2008:183). While, in this context, Paul Brass has a different argument, and he says that major reason for the extremist upsurge in the country is disequilibrium between modernity and political culture. According to him,” if the people move into the modern sector too quickly the prevailing political culture is overwhelmed. And replaced by the new culture of the intruders, from this analogy, it may be said that since in Bangladesh the pace of modernization was very low while traditionalist forces remained dominant” (Ghosh, 1995:69).

In this way, after the Mujibur Rahman’s assassination and numerous coups, General Zia-ur-Rahman took over as Bangladesh’s strongman. Zia who formed the BNP in turn assassinated in September 1978. Zia’s assassination in 1981, and general Ershad’s successful military coup a year later, only deepened the country’s drift away from its secular foundation (Ollapally, 2008:185). Thus, his successor military strongman General Ershad was seeking to legitimize their rule, embraced policies that promoted a more Islamist society, and he incorporated Islam more dramatically into the political sphere, which emboldened and strengthened Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and other Islamist groups. Secularism as the state principle was deleted from the constitution and state actively encouraged the role of Islam in public life. Constitutional restrictions on the establishment of religion-based political parties removed by the military rulers and political parties with Islamic objectives re-emerged, including those who opposed the independence movement (Riaz, 2010:45). For example, General Zia incorporated an Islamic preamble to the constitution in 1977, while General Ershad introduced the 8th Amendment to the constitution that made Islam the state’s official religion in 1988. Both general also marginalized minorities from being promoted with the police, armed forces, and bureaucracy to appease Islamists (DeVotta and Timberman, 2012:2).

According to some analysts, if General Zia and Ershad’s policies are most responsible for the rise of Jamaat-i-Islami and other Islamist groups in Bangladesh then jihadi groups who fought in Afghanistan were a major reason for the introduction of violent Islamist extremism in Bangladesh.

In the post-authoritarian period, both the AL and BNP have cared more about acquiring and maintaining political power than promoting secularism or Islamism
respectively. Awami League is not without its Islamists sympathizers. Subsequently, the Awami League has at the time not shied away from seeking an alliance with Islamist. While, on the other hand, BNP has allied with Islamists mainly because it has lacked better options when seeking to form a government. The BNP’s stance has allowed it to distinguish itself from the AL, even though it has permitted Islamists to broaden their constituency, but both parties’ opportunism has implication for Bangladesh’s prospects (ibid). Macdonald (2016) gives two main reasons for rising of Islamic extremism. These two reasons are the elimination of caretaker government in 2008 and implementation of the war crimes tribunal. Thus, these two incidents are key factors for the rise of recent violent extremism. For example, the men arrested for blogger Niloy Chatterjee’s August 2015 murder were leaders of the Jamaat’s student wing, Chhatra Shibir. Chatterjee was a vocal proponent of the death penalty of Jamaat leaders convicted in war crimes trial. Other attacks on blogger have linked to a new extremist group called Ansarullah Bangla Team Macdonald, 2016:3).

Consolidation of Islamist Groups in Bangladesh

Bangladesh was being racked by hitherto unprecedented violence perpetrated mainly by radical Islamists between 1999 and 2005, causing widespread fears that Bangladesh was on the cusp of becoming a failed state and a bastion for jihadist forces with links to Al Qaeda and similar outfits bent on the perpetrating global jihad. The country experienced its first ever Islamists terrorist attack in Mach 199 when a bomb detonated at a concert killed 15 people. Such attacks proliferated after BNP, and the JI came into power in 2001. Many Sufi shrines and places of worship were destroyed during the early 2000s when radical Islamists ran amuck thanks to the cover their JI patrons in government afforded them and Islamists also targeted the minuscule and besieged Ahmadiyya community. In August 2004, a well-coordinated grenade attack nearly decimated the Awami League leadership. BNP’s elements provided cover for those perpetrating DeVotta and Timberman, 2012:3). As well as, the boycott of BNP and Jamaat of the 2014 elections which gave the Awami League a landslide victory was amid widespread violence. This move stirred up afresh the secular vs. Islamic tension and bred radicalization. The rise of this extreme form of violent Islam is occurring at the time when Bangladesh’s politics has become deeply polarized and creating a governance vacuum (Karim and Balaji, 2016:10).

Key Factors: Rising of ISIS

According to some analyst, there are three factors fueling the sudden spurt in violence in Bangladesh. Two are local, and one is global.

The first local factor is the hanging of both Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury, A senior opposition leader and former minister in Khaleda Zia’s government and Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mujahid of the Jammat-i-Islami party, who were involved in war crimes, especially the killing of Hindus during the 1971 war of liberation. Those executions, combined with the recent arrest of over 10,000 persons belonging to a different religious organization, could have provoked an extremist backlash. Hasina’s
government was guilty of carrying arbitrary arrests mainly to silence her political opponents (Venkatachalam, 2016).

The second factor is that Sheikh Hasina government has been accused of being authoritarian and has also been suspected of muzzling the press and arresting intellectual who has been critical of government’s repressive policy. For example, arbitrary arrest of the editor of the popular online newspaper Daily Star, who has been accusing of collaborating with a military-led coup in 2007 and running false stories against Hasina. That repression also leads to violent response (ibid). According to Allchin (2016), “Recent vicious killings in Bangladesh is a debatable issue, and it is less a terrorism issue than a governance issue. It is the ruling Awami League’s (AL) onslaught against its political opponents, which began in earnest earliest after the last election in January 2014, which unleashed extremism in Bangladesh”. He further argues that “He’s right that the Awami League has harshly targeted its opponents, this is nothing new in Bangladesh, where politics is usually a winner –takes- all game. The Awami League is not to blame for the recent surge in extremism, which began long before the party took power in 2009”.

Karim and Balaji (2015), in this context, have different views and they argue that “In the current context of growing Islamisation, BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party) remains deeply committed to conservatism, nationalism, and anti-communism. It seeks to represent the Islamic conscience of Bangladesh. Awami Leagues’ ideology stems from its commitment to secularism and its staunch belief in Bengali Nationalism and pluralist democracy. Ideological fault lines, questions of secularism, Bengali nationalism and all the role of Islam, are the underlying causes for the persistent growth of radical ideas in the country”.

The global factor is the growth of “madrassas” (religious schools) mainly funded by Saudis. These schools have been responsible for indoctrinating young, impressionable minds with an extremist ideology that is at variance with the teaching of Islam. Muslims belong to other sects (like Shiites), the Islamists have targeted Christians and Hindu.

That is unfortunate that Saudis are pouring in money to set up religious schools designed to propagate an extremist ideology. Bangladesh is now paying a heavy price for their inaction. The government should closely monitor those schools that are imparting religious ideology that does not respect other religions and should come down heavily on such institutions. There is no gainsaying that the ultimate battle against the radical brand of Islam will win in schools and college (ibid).

In a recent attack, it is very dangerous than quite different from earlier attacks, which were carried out by people from a poor background. This time the violence was executed by those who had studied in elite school and colleges and came from affluent families. The Dhaka attack has shown that even people who are highly educated are now being a pull to this particular Wahhabi ideology.

Another alarming thing is that there are indications that Islamic State (also known as ISIS) has been facing reverses in Syria and Iraq and it is the probability that it may spread tentacles in South Asia and may target Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh. But Bangladeshi government has taken this danger very lightly and refused to accept that
IS has infiltrated the country and government is only blaming local groups for the recent attack. Some studies have pointed out that, “however, IS has taken root in Bangladesh definitely because the scale of the Dhaka restaurant attack went beyond the capability of local groups.” Allchin has a similar argument, and he said “A wave of targeted murders in Bangladesh since 2013 has given reason to believe that the country might be the next victim of Islamic State. In a little over the three years, Islamist extremist has killed dozens of bloggers, secular activists, and a member of minority sects, Hindu, and even a Buddhist monk in Bangladesh. The victims are tied together by their diversity and their subsequent existence challenges to monolithic Orthodox visions of political Islam5.

Bangladesh has realized that, even after enforcing counterterrorism strategies, there is no guarantee that Dhaka-type attack could stop, although there is no fool-proof system to pre-empt all attacks, an exchange of intelligence will help this country minimize them. A hard task, but it is the only way to effectively combat terrorism (K.S Venkatachalam, July 6, 2016).

In addition to this, Bangladesh has been witnessing a sudden spurt in Islamic State (IS) inspired suicide attacks, which are rare in the country. A series of suicide attacks mostly targeting security personnel has once again brought to the fore the question of the dreaded international terror group’s links with Bangladesh Islamic militants. For example, in an incident on March 24, 2017, man carrying a bomb blew himself up in the front of a police checkpoint near Bangladesh’s main international airport. The IS immediately took responsibility for the attacks and named the attacker as Abu Mohammad al-Bangali. This example is proof that how IS groups are strengthening their roots in the country. But questions arise here, why such type of incident is taking place in Bangladesh constantly. The reason is very clear, the Bangladeshis fighting for the IS in Iraq and Syria have been a key source of inspiration for the country’s radical Islamic groups, and much Bangladeshi have gone to Syria and Iraq for the cause of the “Caliphate. There is a large number of Bangladeshis who have died in West Asia6.

Conclusion

The political turmoil in Bangladesh has created a dangerous and chaotic environment in which the influence and followers of radical groups have increased greatly. They have support bases in the country as is apparent from suicide attacks that have been launched by them in several parts of Bangladesh. An upsurge in targeted attacks has taken place lately in Bangladesh, amounting to more than two attacks a month since 2013. For example, assailants killed secular blogger Ahmed Rajib Haider on February 15, 2013, after that he posted comments online about religious fundamentalism. Another incident, on July 1, 2016, a group of up to nine Islamic state’s gunmen storms the popular Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka’s diplomatic zone taking a hostage and engaging security forces in a gunbattle. At least, two officers killed, and several dozens were wounded. Bangladesh is in the throes of momentous changes and battle lines between the moderates and hardliners are now clearly drawn (Indian Express, July 2, 2016). There is also the power struggle between political parties and
radical groups, and this tussle may eventually benefit the radical groups. The struggle between the liberal and radical, suicide bombers and the establishment will continue unabated, and if the government fails to control the situation, chaos will prevail, and Bangladesh may collapse as a nation state. Therefore, there are no easy solutions to the chaotic situation developing in Bangladesh. It is evident that the Jihadi insurgents of the country will not give up their fight for an Islamic state or strict sharia laws and will continue to confront Bangladeshi liberal and radical groups. In other words, this is not merely internal problems of Bangladesh but also the radical groups are waiting to gain supremacy, and it can create an explosive situation in the entire South Asian region. In this way, it can say that Islamist extremism has been rising in Bangladesh, with the usually tolerant country coming under threat from homegrown militants as well as transnational terror groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). Radical Islamisation has created an atmosphere of threats upon society and politics, and violence has victimized religious minorities including the minority sect of Islam. In this way, it is necessary to target its weak democratic institutions to prevent political violence in Bangladesh, which foster exclusion, radicalisation, and extremism.

Notes
1 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=BD
2 http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2008/12/02/bangladesh-at-the-crossroads-democracy-radicalisation-and-terrorism-amidst-the-emerging-security-challenges-of
3 Khatme Nebuwat is last Prophet, according to Islam, Muhammad is the last Prophet. In other word, International Khatme Nabuwat movement means to a movement to assert that Mohammad was the last Prophet, a fact which the IKNMB asserts is denied by the Amadiyyas. The Ahmadiyya reject the allegation.
5 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/bangladesh/2016-06-09/rise-extremism-bangladesh

References


