From Burma to Ramgarh: The Origins of the Chinese Expeditionary Force Ramgarh Training Center

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In 1942, the Chinese Expeditionary Force was sent into Burma to fight against the Japanese. As Burma fell into the hands of the Japanese, the Chinese soldiers were brought to Ramgarh, northeast India, for training. The process of withdrawing the Chinese units from Burma to India and the negotiation of selecting Ramgarh as the site for training the Chinese troops, however, have not drawn any scholarly attention. This article argues that the establishment of the Ramgarh Training Center was a result of decades-long colonial internment camp building in India and the disputes and compromises that arose between the British, American, and Chinese authorities during World War II. It further points out that the transnationalization of approaches and archives is necessary for us to better comprehend China’s War of Resistance that has long been narrated within the Chinese national historiography.

Keywords: World War II; the Chinese Expeditionary Force; British India

Introduction

From September 1942 to the end of World War II, more than 60,000 Chinese soldiers underwent training in Ramgarh, a small town in northeastern India’s mountainous area. Although Ramgarh would go on to be the largest Chinese military build-up overseas in the twentieth century, the Chinese experience there has not been elaborated in adequate detail. Questions including why the Chinese troops came to India in the first place and why the Allies selected Ramgarh as the site of the training center have been glossed over without consulting any substantial archival research. Thus, this article argues that the lack of serious academic investigation in the history of the Chinese Expeditionary Force (CEF) can be attributed to the lack of multinational archival work and transnational approach.

Since the 2000s, a large number of literary works, TV series, and documentaries about the experience of the CEF have been produced in China. Most of these productions, however, share a similar storyline: (1) the CEF was firstly defeated by the
Japanese in Burma due to the British betrayal, before (2) suffered greatly during the retreat, (3) after which they were rejuvenated with intensive training and modern equipment in India, (4) leading to their eventual reconquest of Burma in the end. By highlighting the sacrifice, bravery, patience, passion, and patriotism of the Chinese soldiers in foreign lands, the narrative framework of these popular works has been echoing the crescendo of Chinese nationalism in recent decades.

When compared to the great public interest in the story of the CEF, it is surprising to see a lack of serious scholarship on this topic. The research of Chinese scholars has been restricted to politics of the elite and military history and mainly focuses on exploring why the Chinese nationalist government sent its troops to Burma and the contribution of the CEF to the Allies’ victory in World War II (Wang, 2016; Li, 2013; Han, 2012; Song, 2011; Fang, 2004; Chen, 2004; Wang, 2002; Fan, 1996). Western scholars, who have long been biased by their Eurocentric view on this issue and who have limited access to Chinese archives, pay a great deal of attention to the American/British war effort in the China-Burma-India Theatre while downplaying, if not outright ignoring, the role of the CEF (Wheeler 2015; McLynn 2011; Dunlop, 2007; Marston, 2003; Slim, 1951).

The underdevelopment of the scholarship of the CEF has been in contrast with the recent paradigm change of War of Resistance studies. In the past two decades, historians have demonstrated a growing trend of thinking outside the paradigm of political and military historiography in their analysis of the War of Resistance. They contend that the War of Resistance is not merely about enemy atrocities, civilian sufferings and resilience, and heroic actions, but also of other ways of responding to the war, such as desertion, collaboration, and smuggling (Barnes, 2018; Gong, 2012; Wang, 2010; Parks, 2003; Barret and Shyu, 2001; Fu, 1993). To fully make sense of the wartime experience and individual choices, we may need to take both local and transnational perspectives into consideration.

In fact, there exists a large number of memoirs and interviews of CEF veterans, through which we could partly reconstruct contemporary local and personal contexts (Zhang, 2016; Zhou, 2015; Zhu, 2014; Bai, 2013; Huang, 2007; Yao, 2005; Ge, 1995; Li, 1993). These works, however, only emphasize the Chinese victory, while the alternative ways of responding to the war have never been voiced out. Worse still, instead of being utilized for scholarly analysis, most of the memoirs and interviews have been used to substitute, justify, and strengthen the nationalist rhetoric in the narratives of the CEF. Furthermore, the nationalist interpretation has kept scholars from taking the transnational perspective and approaching the transnational primary sources as most studies only address the activities of the Chinese soldiers while largely ignore the specific scenery where these soldiers fought, stayed, and underwent training. One solution to rescue the study of the CEF from the predominance of the national historiography is to contextualize the experience of the CEF against the socio-political backdrop of the British Raj in the 1940s. Unfortunately, few scholars have investigated the origins of the CEF Ramgarh Training Center. Due to the lack of a coordinative work of taking the British, American, Indian, and Chinese documents into a single study, we do not know under what circumstance the British authorities agreed to let
the Americans train the Chinese soldiers in India and for what reason the CEF was accommodated in Ramgarh. Thus, through using multinational primary sources, this article not only aims to answer the questions above, but also tries to provide a template for future scholars to transcend the limitations of national history.

Retreating the CEF from Burma to India
In early 1942, the British Empire’s colonies in Southeast Asia were under attack by the Japanese. In only a few months, Hong Kong, Malaya, and Singapore were all occupied by the Japanese. The Burma Road, which was used by the Allies to supply materials to China’s nationalist government in Chongqing, was also in danger. In fear of a Japanese invasion of Burma and the cut-off of the supply line of the Burma Road, the Chinese nationalist government made a decision to establish the CEF to help the defense of Burma in January 1942. As the Japanese launched the Burma Campaign in the same month, the Chinese Fifth Army, the Sixth Army, and the Sixty-six Army that totaled around 100,000 soldiers entered into Burma to join the battles.

The situation in Burma deteriorated dramatically in March 1942. The lack of mutual trust, coordination, and communication between the British and the Chinese commanding officers led to several major Allied defeats. As big cities such as Rangoon and Mandalay and most airfields in the country fell into the hands of the Japanese, the collapse of the defensive line was all but inevitable.

In April 1942, when the Allies began withdrawing their troops from Burma, the British forces were brought back to India through the eastern Indian state of Manipur with heavy casualties and loss of most equipment. The CEF retreat was more complicated than the British one. Part of the CEF that stayed along the China-Burma border retreated back to Yunnan in early May. The majority of the CEF, however, was trapped in northern Burma. As the Burma Road that connected Burma and China was cut off, the rest of the CEF had only two options to avoid being captured and exterminated by the Japanese: either return to China through the mountainous areas of northern Burma or enter into British India.

Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Chinese nationalist government, had long been uncomfortable with the British imperialism and had blamed the failure of the Allies in Burma on the British selfishness. Worrying that the CEF would be controlled and manipulated by the British in India, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the CEF to retreat to China through Kachin Hills, a mountainous area of northwest Burma. The retreat route though Kachin Hills, however, proved to be a disaster as more than half of the CEF soldiers perished in the jungles due to the lack of supplies.

Understanding this risk, the New 38th Division of the CEF led by Gen. Sun Li-jen, defied the order of Chiang Kai-shek to enter into Kachin Hills. While in Bhamo in northern Burma to cover the retreat of other CEF units, Sun Li-jen had realized that the original retreat plan was impractical and dangerous. To save his own unit, Sun Li-jen led his troops westward into British India and arrived in Imphal on May 25, 1942. In explaining his defiance of the order, Sun Li-jen telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek that he was forced to move his unit into India on the grounds that his retreat route into Kachin Hills was blocked by the Japanese.
Chiang Kai-shek did not take any action against Sun Li-jen on the defiance of the order, as he himself acknowledged that the cost of retreating through Kachin Hills was too high. In fact, Chiang himself had asked the commander of the CEF, Gen. Luo Zhuoying, to find some local guides to help him walk out of the jungles and retreat into India, from where he could return to China later.\(^8\) In late May, Chiang also asked another commander of the CEF, Gen. Du Yuming, to bring his troops to India for supplies.\(^9\)

The British reaction to the arrival of the CEF in India was rather ambiguous. On one hand, they needed more troops to defend India for a possible Japanese invasion; on the other, they did not trust the poorly equipped and low-morale CEF could prove any substantial support. Sun Li-jen’s New 38th Division was transported by the British from Imphal to Ledo to defend the local airfields.\(^10\) But in Ledo, Sun Li-jen was frustrated by their treatment and the woeful conditions there. Chinese soldiers were accommodated in temporarily built tents with limited supplies and were exposed to humid and hot weather.\(^11\) Sun Li-jen further complained that the British had neither adequate resources nor confidence to defend Ledo and that the Chinese troops there might be betrayed by the British just as before in Burma. In a telegraph to Chiang Kai-shek, Sun Li-jen urged Chiang to take the CEF in India back to China as soon as possible.\(^12\)

The Americans had been considering training the Chinese troops in India with the Burma Campaign still ongoing. Gen. Joseph Stilwell, the commander of the Allies’ China-Burma-India (CBI) theatre, attributed the CEF’s weak performance to the inefficiency, despotism, and corruption of Chinese commanding officers. Stilwell insisted that the American-trained and equipped Chinese troops would be of great use in future campaigns against the Japanese in the CBI theatre.\(^13\)

In May 1942, Stilwell formally told Chiang Kai-shek that the U.S. government would like to provide equipment and resources through the Lend-Lease Act to train Chinese troops in India.\(^14\) Chiang Kai-shek responded to this proposal enthusiastically and agreed to send 100,000 soldiers to India, with the intention that the modernized troops could not only be deployed to fight the Japanese but also strengthen his domestic rule in postwar China.\(^15\) This plan, however, was temporarily shelved as Burma was lost to the Japanese and the Burma Road was cut off.

Stilwell did not give up his plan of training the Chinese troops. When he learnt that some CEF units had entered into India, he sent his agents to inspect their condition and helped arrange supplies for the Chinese.\(^16\) In June 1942, Stilwell successfully persuaded Chiang Kai-shek to let the CEF units stay in India for recuperation and receive American training and equipment.

Regarding the site of the training camp, however, Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell had different concerns. Chiang proposed Darjeeling in Assam as the training site on the grounds that it was close to the Chinese border and that the Chinese troops could be easily transported back to China via Tibet.\(^17\) Chiang’s suggestion was conflicted with the intention of Stilwell who wanted the trained Chinese troops to be used in the reconquest of Burma. In other words, if Chiang Kai-shek found a site that was close to the Chinese border and decided to withdraw all of his troops back to China once
the training completed, Stilwell would then have no troops in hand to achieve his military goal.\(^{18}\)

In declining Chiang Kai-shek’s proposal, Stilwell stressed that Darjeeling was too far away from the main transportation lines to receive adequate supplies. Instead, Ramgarh, a small town 200 miles northeast of Calcutta, was more suitable for the training program.\(^{19}\) Stilwell further elaborated three advantages that Ramgarh had: climate, location, and facilities.

Firstly, Ramgarh sits in the district of Hazaribah in southern Bihar (today’s Jharkhand state in the Republic of India). The Hazaribagh district lies in the heart of the Chota Nagpur Plateau with an average altitude of 600 meters (Lister, 1917: 2). The relatively high altitude of the district makes its climate different from other neighbouring districts. The yearly average temperature in the early twentieth century in Hazaribagh was around 23°C and the mean humidity was about 51%, much lower than coastal areas such as Calcutta (mean humidity was 76% around the year). Even during the rainy season, which begins from June each year, the air in Hazaribagh is much drier than in lower regions (Lister, 1917: 24-25). Since more than half of the CEF soldiers who arrived in India were suffering from tropical diseases and malnutrition, Stilwell had argued that the climate in Ramgarh would be essential for them to recover and to be able to take part in the ensuing training and fighting.\(^{20}\)

Secondly, Ramgarh lies in the Damodar Valley and sits on a rich coalfield (Lister, 1917: 28-29). To transport coals out, a railway station was built in Ramgarh in the early twentieth century, and the town was directly connected to big cities such as Patna and Calcutta through the Grand Chord Railway and the Bengal Nagpur Railway (Lister, 1917: 144-145). In 1939 the Indian National Congress selected Ramgarh as the site for its 53rd session with the reason that it was located at the junction of several railway lines.\(^{21}\) Considering that supplies could be brought to Ramgarh very easily from Calcutta and Patna, while trained troops could be transported to the Burma frontline through Ledo, the location of Ramgarh was perfect for the training program.

Thirdly, there was a huge cantonment of the Indian army in Ramgarh, which was largely vacant in 1942. With the established facilities of the cantonment, Stilwell thought that there would be no difficult in accommodating the Chinese soldiers.\(^{22}\)

Persuaded by Stilwell, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to let his troops go to Ramgarh. Nevertheless, when Stilwell requested the Government of India to make arrangements for the Chinese in Ramgarh, the Government of India told Stilwell that they were unbale to take in any Chinese units because the facilities of the cantonment in Ramgarh were too old and impoverished.\(^{23}\) What the British did not reveal to Stilwell was that they had a modern PoW (Prisoner of War) internment camp in Ramgarh next to the cantonment. By evacuating the internees in the internment camp, the British could easily accommodate the CEF in Ramgarh.

**Ramgarh from the PoW Internment Camp to the CEF Training Center**

India was not a usual destination for PoWs of the British Empire until the Boer War. During the Second Boer War (1899-1902), the British authorities in South Africa found that it was difficult to accommodate large numbers of Boer PoWs due to limited resources and security risks. An evacuation of the Boer PoWs from South Africa to
other parts of the British Empire such as Mauritius, Seychelles, Ceylon, and St. Helena was launched. When the small islands were filled up with the PoWs, the Government of India was pressed to share the burden of other colonies. By the end of the Boer War, there were around 9,000 Boer PoWs in India (Hofmeyr, 2012: 365).

To accommodate these PoWs, the Government of India built 17 internment camps across India. Most of the camps located around the cantonment areas for accessible transportation and military guards.

Since the British authorities took the Boers as white people, the Boer PoWs had never been used as laborers in India on the grounds that the British were afraid that their colonial legitimacy would be undermined if the locals saw white people were doing menial labour. Furthermore, facilities such as playgrounds, schools, libraries, and cinemas were added into the internment camp to meet the needs of the internees (Hofmeyr, 2012: 366). These measures of accommodating the white PoWs in internment camps with easy and comfortable facilities were all kept in India in the following decades. During World War I, German and Austrian civilians in India were sent to this sort of the internment camps for detention (Thormeyer, 2010).

During World War II, around 60,000 Italian soldiers were captured by the British in North and East Africa. Although these Italian PoWs were firstly imprisoned in Egypt, the British authorities soon found that the local political situation and supplies were no longer sufficient to maintain such a large number of the PoWs, especially when the possibility of an imminent German invasion of Egypt was looming (Moore, 2002: 20-21).

From 1940, the Italian PoWs in Egypt were evacuated to other parts of the British Empire. By the end of 1941, the Government of India had received more than 45,000 Italian PoWs. At the same time, all males (except diplomats) from hostile countries (mostly Germans) who were over 16 years old in India were arrested by the civilian authorities and handed over to the military. To accommodate the PoWs and civilian detainees, the Government of India set up 29 internment camps in cantonment areas across the country. All of these camps were properly heated and lighted with adequate space for both indoor and outdoor activities of the internees. Facilities such as playgrounds, shower baths, toilets, and hospitals were provided. Internees were also given free rations of food, fuel, lighting, and water.

Due to its location and climate, Ramgarh was selected as one of the 29 internment camps in India. In 1940, an internment camp was built alongside the Ramgarh cantonment and based on the standard of other civilian internment camps in India with full facilities accessible. The first group of the internees in the Ramgarh internment camp comprised German civilians from the Dutch East Indies. Since Nazi Germany invaded the Netherlands in May 1940, German citizens residing in the Dutch East Indies had been detained by the Dutch colonial authorities. In fear of an imminent Japanese attack, the Dutch later dispatched the German internees to India. By April 1941, the Ramgarh internment camp housed 600 German civilians.

In addition to the Germans, the Italian PoWs, most of whom were high-ranking officers, were also brought into Ramgarh. In fact, the British authorities developed a policy of turning some of the Italian PoWs into anti-Fascist elements. The first step
to implement this policy was to dismantle the disciplinary structure of the unit to prevent hard-line fascist elements continuing to promote anti-British ideas. Once the Italian PoWs arrived in India, soldiers and officers were separated and sent to different internment camps.29 High-ranking Italian officers were sent to internment camps that had full access to facilities, with the hope that the good treatment in the PoW camps would undermine the will of Italians to continue the fight and induce large-scale surrenders.30 Because the Ramgarh internment camp met the demands of providing comfortable living conditions for the officers, some 2,000 Italian officers were taken in.

The Ramgarh internment camp was separated into two parts. One part was for the Italian PoWs, while the other for the German civilians. The camp, which was encircled with wired fence, was designed to accommodate around 7,000 people. The living space both for the Italians and the Germans was at the center of the camp. In the north, a couple of bungalows were used as bathroom, washhouse, drying room, and toilets. The cook house, canteen, medical room, and clothes and shoe shop were located to the south.31

By evacuating the internees and erecting some tents in the living space, the Ramgarh internment camp could easily accommodate the CEF units and provide facilities for their recuperation. Nonetheless, the Government of India did not even inform Stilwell of the camp’s existence when he proposed to set up a training center in Ramgarh. The reluctance of the British authorities to let the Chinese troops stay in India can be attributed to the troubled Sino-British relations throughout the War.

The Troubled Alliance: Sino-British Relations during World War II

Although the British authorities and the Chinese nationalist government were allies during World War II, the relations between the two powers were by no means stable and friendly. Both countries had geopolitical concerns that placed them at loggerheads throughout the War. From 1937 to 1941, the British government took the appeasement policy towards the Japanese military expansion in China in order to safeguard its colonial rule in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia (Perry, 2011; Bickers, 1999; Best, 1995; Haggie, 1981; Shai, 1974; Lee, 1973; Clifford, 1967). Frustrated by the British appeasement, the Chinese nationalist government turned to the Soviet Union for aid and support (Yao, 2015; Garver, 1988). Worrying that a Sino-Soviet Union alliance would jeopardize the British interest in Xinjiang and central Asia, the British authorities even made a secret agreement with the Japanese in 1940 to share intelligence regarding the communist and Soviet activities in the region (Lin, 2005).

The outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941 brought the British and the Chinese into an alliance. One of the primary concerns of the Chinese nationalist government at that time was to maintain the supply line from India and Burma to China. The political situation in India, however, was all but stable. Most Indian nationalists were outraged by the British decision of involving India into the war without consulting the Indian people. The Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia convinced the Indian nationalists that if they could not obtain independence immediately India would be under attack of the Japanese.
To mediate the tension between the British authorities and the Indian nationalists in order to stabilize the political situation in India, Chiang Kai-shek made a visit to India in February 1942 (Xiao, 2018; Duan, 2009; Ji, 2002; Chen, 1991). Since Chiang Kai-shek was in sympathy with the Indian nationalist movement, he had not only tried to persuade Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy of India, to make compromise with the Indian nationalists, but also talked with Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi in person to show his support to the nationalist appeal of the Indian people.

Chiang Kai-shek’s approach to the Indian nationalists upset the British authorities. Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of the British government, complained that Chiang Kai-shek had tried to act as the judge between the British and the Indians and that Chiang’s attempt to press the Government of India to make a deal with the Congress was an intervention of the internal affairs of India. The British government even made a plan to retaliate Chinese support to the Indian nationalist movement by encouraging the Tibetan government to seek their own independence from China. The British concern of the Chinese expansion into Southeast and South Asia had been deepened when the CEF was ready to enter into Burma in early 1942. For fear that the Chinese nationalist government would develop its own influence in Burma through the military operation, the British authorities hesitated to let the Chinese troops get involved in the defense of Burma from the outset. Even when the Chinese troops were called into Burma, the British were unwilling to provide necessary supplies (Du, 1986).

The British authorities also worried that the Chinese active involvement in South and Southeast Asia had largely been supported by the Americans. The U.S. government had long been uncomfortable with the colonial order in Asia since the early twentieth century (Manela, 2007; Louis, 1978). During World War II, the American policymakers had gradually reached a consensus that China could be the perfect ally for the Americans in Asia. On one hand, the Chinese nationalist government, with its anti-communist standing, could be a vital force to deter the expansion of the Soviet Union into Asia; on the other, China could be a more manageable and moderate power to replace the British colonial order in the region (Whifield, 2001: 40-60; Stoler, 2000; Liu, 1996; Xiang, 1995; Sbrega, 1983).

When Stilwell raised the proposal of training the Chinese troops in Ramgarh in June 1942, the British authorities linked the proposal to the Chinese intervention of India’s internal politics, Chinese expansion into Southeast Asia, and the American support of China’s growing influence in Asia at the cost of the British Empire. In the eyes of the British policymakers in both London and New Delhi, a Chinese army training center in India would definitely give the Chinese a great leverage to further weaken the already precarious colonial rule in India. Some officials in the Government of India even believed that the Chinese troops in Ramgarh would back the Indian nationalists if a revolution or general strike break out in India.

Being fully aware of the risk of accommodating a large number of Chinese soldiers in India, the British authorities tried to decline Stilwell’s proposal directly. However, since the British were heavily relied on the American support during the War, they had been unwilling to antagonize the Americans by revealing their own
geo-political concerns. A non-political reason, which stated that the Ramgarh containment was too old to be the CEF training center, was proposed as an objection to Stilwell’s plan.

After having been informed by his agents of the existence of the internment camp in Ramgarh, Stilwell then pointed out that the British could use the internment camp as the CEF training center by evacuating the internees and PoWs there. Knowing the concern of the British, Stilwell stressed that the training of the Chinese troops in India was short-term and temporary and that the trained units would be immediately dispatched to Burma for operation. Thus, as an act of solidarity in their cooperation with other Allies and their willingness to repair their marred relationship with China, British authorities agreed to evacuate the Ramgarh internment camp and turn it into the CEF training center in the end of June 1942.

Conclusion
In early August 1942, around 10,000 Chinese soldiers (from the New 38th Division and the Fifth Army) arrived in Ramgarh and started their training. Some CEF soldiers later recalled that when they entered the residential area of the Ramgarh camp, they were surprised by the spacious rooms and modern sophisticated facilities (Wang, 2005: 166). By early 1944, more than 60,000 Chinese soldiers had been trained in Ramgarh and were ready to join the renewed campaign of recapturing Burma. In March 1942, the Chinese 22nd and 38th Divisions of the CEF advanced into Burma from northeast India with the aim of reopening the Ledo Road that connected India with China. In May 1944, the CEF laid a siege of Myitkyina, one of the most important hubs along the Ledo Road. Owing to the hard fighting, inadequate supplies, and tropical disease, the CEF suffered heavy casualties before took Myitkyina in August 1944. The recapture of Myitkyina not only forced the Japanese forces out of northern Burma but also facilitated the Allies’ supplies to China through the Ledo Road.

Nonetheless, as Hans van de Ven notes, the contribution of the CEF to the recapture of Burma was limited. Central and southern Burma was mainly recaptured by the British and Indian forces after they defeated the Japanese in the Battle of Imphal and the Battle of Kohima in late 1944. The CEF, after their capture of Myitkyina, remained in the area until April 1945 when they were transported back to China (Van, 2003).

The importance of the CEF, however, has been either mythicized or ignored. In Chinese national history, the experience of the CEF in India and Burma was one of many episodes that demonstrates how Chinese soldiers fought against the Japanese invaders bravely and sacrificed themselves for the cause of their nation. The national history fails to produce more serious and critical scholarship but inspires the growth of the genre of popular works that mythicize the CEF. The Western scholarship of the Pacific War have largely ignored the CEF as a whole.

The lack of scholarly attention to the CEF has led to confusion and errors in the historical record. In a book on the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theatre of World War II, Ramgarh has been described as a camp that used to detain more than 20,000 Italian PoWs during World War I (Xu, 2007). A memoir drafted by a former CEF officer states that the CEF selected Ramgarh as the site of its training center because
of its remoteness and beautiful landscape (Sun, 2005). Overall, most works that touch on the CEF fail to elaborate the specific context and backdrop that gave rise to the establishment of the CEF Ramgarh training center (Vu, 2019; Tuchman, 2017: 404; Dunlop, 2016; Lathrop, 1981).

By employing multinational archives and documents, this study puts the establishment of the CEF Ramgarh training center in the context of the decades-long history of the colonial internment camp building in India and the Sino-British adversaries during World War II. In so doing, this study not only examines the origins of the CEF experience in India, but also intends to transcend the limits of the Chinese national historiography in the study of China’s War of Resistance.

**Funding Statement**
This study is funded by the National Social Science Foundation of China (Reg. No. 18CSS040).

**Endnotes**

1 A brief search of the website of the National Library China indicated that more than 100 literary works related to the CEF have been published in Chinese since 1990. Zhongguo yuanzhengjun (The Chinese Expeditionary Force), a 56-episode TV series released in 2012 and Wode tuanzhang wodetuan (My Chief and My Regiment), a 43-episode TV series released in 2009 are all well received among Chinese audience. Additionally, the Chinese state television broadcaster CCTV released a 12-episode documentary Zhongguo yuanzhengjun (The Chinese Expeditionary Force) in 2010 and further raised public’s interest in the history of the CEF.

2 Academia Historica (Taipei), Jiangzhongzheng zongtong wenwu, yuanzheng rumian 1 (Documents of President Chiang Kai-shek, Expedition in Burma 1), Feb. 3, 1942.

3 Academia Historica, Jiangzhongzheng zongtong wenwu, yuanzheng rumian 3 (Documents of President Chiang Kai-shek, Expedition in Burma 3), Apr. 28, 1942.

4 Academia Historica, Jiangzhongzheng zongtong wenwu, yuanzheng rumian 2 (Documents of President Chiang Kai-shek, Expedition in Burma 2), May 22, 1942.

5 Academia Historica, Jiangzhongzheng zongtong wenwu, yuanzheng rumian 2 (Documents of President Chiang Kai-shek, Expedition in Burma 2), May 16, 1942.

6 Academia Historica, Jiangzhongzheng zongtong wenwu, yuanzheng rumian 3 (Documents of President Chiang Kai-shek, Expedition in Burma 3), May 26, 1942.

7 Academia Historica, Jiangzhongzheng zongtong wenwu, gemingwenxian, tongmengguolianhezuozhan, yuanzhengjun rumian 2 (Documents of President Chiang Kai-shek, materials of nationalist revolution, the cooperative war plans of the Allies, the Chinese Expeditionary Force in Burma 2), May 22, 1942.

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9 Academia Historica, Jiangzhongzheng zongtong wenwu, yuanzheng rumian 3 (Documents of President Chiang Kai-shek, Expedition in Burma 3), May 27, 1942.

10 Academia Historica, Jiangzhongzheng zongtong wenwu, gemingwenxian, tongmengguolianhezuozhan, yuanzhengjun rumian 2 (Documents of President Chiang
Kai-shek, materials of nationalist revolution, the cooperative war plans of the Allies, the Chinese Expeditionary Force in Burma 2), 5 June 1942.

11 Academia Historica, Jiangzhongzheng zongtong wenwu, yuanzheng rumian 2 (Documents of President Chiang Kai-shek, Expedition in Burma 2), 13 June 1942.
12 Academia Historica, Jiangzhongzheng zongtong wenwu, yuanzheng rumian 3 (Documents of President Chiang Kai-shek, Expedition in Burma 3), 10 June 1942.
13 Academia Historica, Jiangzhongzheng zongtong wenwu, gemingwenxian, tongmengguolianhezuozhan, shidiweijiangjun jiuzhi (Documents of President Chiang Kai-shek, materials of nationalist revolution, the cooperative war plans of the Allies, the inauguration of general Stilwell), 15 June 1942.
14 Academia Historica, Jiangzhongzheng zongtong wenwu, kunmianji chugao 7 (Documents of President Chiang Kai-shek, Kunmianji chugao 7), 3 May 1942.
15 Academia Historica, Jiangzhongzheng zongtong wenwu, gemingwenxian, tongmengguolianhezuozhan, shidiweijiangjun jiuzhi (Documents of President Chiang Kai-shek, materials of nationalist revolution, the cooperative war plans of the Allies, the inauguration of general Stilwell), May 6, 1942.
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18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Academia Historica, Jiangzhongzheng zongtong wenwu, yuanzheng rumian 3 (Documents of President Chiang Kai-shek, Expedition in Burma 3), April 16, 1942.
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23 Ibid.
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25 Colonial Office (CO) 968/45/1, Wavell to WO, Apr. 8, 1941; CO968/451, Governor of Ceylon to CO, Jan. 22, 1941.
27 Ibid., 4–5.
28 National Archives of India (NAI), External Affairs Department, War Branch, 30 (8)-W/42 (Secret), from Deputy Secretary to the Government of India to the Consul General for Netherlands, Nov. 18, 1943.
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